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FOREWORD
This In-Space Propellant Logistics and Safety Study was performed by
the Space Division of North American Rockwell Corporation for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Marshall Space Flight Center, under
Contract NAS8-27692. The study was a twelve-month effort initiated on
June 25, 1971, and completed on June 23, 1972.
The study was conducted as two separate, but related projects. One
project addressed the systems and operational problems associated with the
transport, transfer, and storage of cryogenic propellants in low earth orbits,
while the other project addressed the safety problems connected with in-
space propellant logistics operations. Correlation between the two projects
was maintained by including safety considerations resulting from the System
Safety Analysis in the trade studies and evaluations of alternate operating
concepts in the Systems/Operations Analysis.
Walter E. Whitacre of Marshall Space Flight Center, Advanced Systems
Analysis Office, was the Contracting Officer's Representative and-provided
technical direction to the overall contract and to the Systems/Operations
Analysis project; Walter Stafford of the same office provided technical
direction to the System Safety Analysis project. The contractor effort was
under the direction of Robert E. Sexton, Program Manager; the Systems/
Operations Analysis effort was led by Robert L. Moore and the System Safety
Analysis effort was led by William E. Plaisted. Key technical contributors
were G. F. Ruf f , System Safety Analysis and Trade Studies, and J. R. Cook,
Literature Review, Preventive Measures, and Guidelines and Requirements.
This document is Volume II of the following three volumes which
contain the System Safety Analysis.
Volume I Executive Summary
Volume II System Safety Guidelines and
Requirements
Volume III System Safety Analysis
(SD 72-SA-0054-1)
(SD 72-SA-0054-2)
(SD 72-SA-0054-3)
The results of the Systems/Operations Analysis portion of the study are
contained in the following five volumes:
Volume I
Volume II
Executive Summary
Technical Report
(SD 72-SA-0053-1)
(SD 72-SA-0053-2)
- iii -
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North American Rockwell
Volume III Trade Studies (SD 72-SA-0053-3)
Volume IV Project Planning Data (SD 72-SA-0053-4)
Volume V Cost Estimates (SD 72-SA-0053-5)
This volume contains the guidelines and requirements to be applied to
the design and operation of systems to transport propellants into space for
subsequent use by another vehicle, to store propellants in space, or to
transfer propellants from one element to another in space. It identifies
two distinct methods of using the Guidelines and Requirements. The first
would use them to define a safe concept of propellant delivery, and the
second would be to use them as a checklist to determine whether an established
concept was a safe one.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This volume of the final report contains detailed system safety guide-
lines/requirements (GLR's) developed during the course of the study. Each
GLR describes a safety measure which is suggested as a means of eliminating
or reducing a particular hazard, or group of hazards, to an acceptable level,
and which, if followed would tend to increase the level of safety in supply-
ing propellants to a user in orbit.
The development of GLR's was intended to serve two goals. The first was to
identify those actions that should be taken to make propellent logistics
operations as safe as possible. The second was to serve as a checklist to
verify that these actions had been taken in the design and operation of this
and similar programs, or that they had been considered and rejected.
The safety measures described in the GLR's are directed toward the
prevention of hazards, the avoidance of undesired events, and the protection
of the crew. Specific corrective action is, to a large measure, dependent
on the state of events at the time of occurrence, the condition of the hard-
ware after occurrence of the hazard, and upon the configuration of the systems
in total. Measures for corrective action must be developed when the configura-
tion of the system has been defined and the operational procedures are being
written.
The guidelines/requirements take into account the results of the analysis
of all the preventive measures taken against all the hazards that were identi-
fied. The study concentrated on propellant handling systems and operations in
orbit. Hazards associated with ground and launch operations have also been
studied and reported elsewhere; only such ground operations that would be
unique to propellant logistics are reported here. These unique operations are
concerned primarily with the use of slush propellants.
Several of the GLR's rely on the presence of monitoring devices for
their execution. Section 5.3 of Volume III, "Monitoring Devices," contains
a listing and a more detailed discussion of the need for these devices.
Each GLR appears only once and is numbered in serial with the others.
The first 48 GLR's are numbered in sequence in the order in which they would
be applied during pre-launch, ascent, deployment, docking, transfer, retrieval,
and re-entry. GLR's 49 through 63 apply to all propellant logistics operations.
Examples of their application to safety-critical propellant logistics opera-
tions are given.
- 1 - SD72-SA-0054-2
Space Division
North American Rockwell
2.0 DERIVATION OF GUIDELINES/REQUIREMENTS (GLR)
As in-space propellant logistics operations were analyzed for system
safety, each hazard was identified and was entered on a hazard analysis sheet
(Figure 2.0-1). The conditions leading to and the effects of the hazard were
presented in the hazard description/effects block.
Preventive measures to be applied to eliminate the hazard or to reduce
it to an acceptable level are presented in the action recommended block of
the sheet. These measures are specific to the hazard postulated, with the
stated systems being operated under the conditions stated. The goals of the
preventive measures were practical solutions, using methods and techniques
that have been proven successful in the past to solve similar problems with
existing state-of-the-art. Extrapolations of the state-of-the-art have been
identified.
The preventive measures provided the basis for the development of GLR's.
The measures were grouped under headings that also served as titles for
individual GLR's. Each preventive measure developed has been included in at
least one generalized GLR.
2.1 GLR DESCRIPTION
2.1.1 A GLR sheet is shown in Figure 2.1.1-1. A description of each of the
elements composing this sheet follows.
2.1.1.1 Number
The number was assigned in sequential order of use during a normal launch,
orbital operation, and re-entry. The assigned number is used as an identifier
throughout this volume.
2.1.1.2 Hazard Group
There were 12 hazard groups used in the study. These are representative
of the hazards which could be broadly grouped from the various phases of the
missions and operations of the representative orbital propellant logistic
concept.
Hazard Group 1 - Fire/Explosion/Implosion
Group 1 includes hazards created by chemical reactions, catalytic action,
frictional effects, or other heat generating principles. It further includes
explosions initiated by fire or spark and those which are not necessarily fire
initiated, such as overpressurization; instantaneous release of high pressures
by container fracture; or reactions in ambient conditions where gaseous hydrogen
and oxygen are combined in proportions of 4 and 2 percent by volume or greater
and the resulting mixture is subjected to pressures of 2 mm of Mercury or more
and is subjected to an initiation source, such as a catalytic reaction with a
nickel, zirconium, etc., impact or spark.
- 2 - SD72-SA-0054-2
Figure 2.1.1-1
ISPLS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
GUIDELINE TITLE:
STATEMENT:
(SAMPLE GLR SHEET)
REMARKS:
REFERENCES: CROSS REFERENCES:
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Implosion includes those hazards in which an adverse A? is created across
a structure (tank) by the reduction of internal pressure during such activities
as drainage of fluid from a locked up volume, cryo-pumping, or venting to
vacuum and locking the tank up for re-entry into the earth's atmosphere.
Hazard Group 2 - Reduced Integrity of Structure or Equipment
Group 2 includes conditions which subject a structure or equipment to
some level of degradation, such as possible adverse stress due to exposure
resulting from temperature extremes, interaction between fluids and materials,
reduction in critical characteristics or materials capability, functional
degradation due to loss of supporting equipment, and out of sequence operations.
Hazard Group 3 - Contamination
Group 3 includes hazards related to those conditions producing or intro-
ducing contamination. The contamination ranges from traces to large particles,
including products of combustion, ice crystals, and metal chips.
Hazard Group 4 - Corrosion
Group 4 includes those conditions which adversely damage personnel or
material surfaces by chemical attack.
Hazard Group 5 - Toxicity
Group 5 includes hazards related to the production of a toxic substance
which affects the human body adversely.
Hazard Group 6 - Heat and Temperature
Group 6 includes those conditions related to excursions of temperature
ranging from extreme heat to extreme cold.
Hazard Group 7 - Loss of Thrust
Group 7 covers those cases where loss of thrust is experienced when it
is needed for scheduled operations. In includes problems involved in main
and auxiliary propulsion engines and propulsive vents.
Hazard Group 8 - Unscheduled Vehicle Impact
Group 8 includes impact hazards involving loss of target by the vehicle
avionics or ground net; impact of meteoroid and/or space debris with the
vehicle due to mechanical failures or delays in valve actuation for any
reason; impact due to loss of docking aids or incorrect approach alignment;
and impact from inadvertent misoperation of RCS, propulsive vents, etc.
Manipulator related hazards, such as loss of TV and lighting, impact of the
cargo with the structure, and damage caused by sloshing or unstabilizing
effects are also included. Human error has been included in the group as
related to impacts while is in manual control or commands are introduced for
remote activation.
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Hazard Group 9 - Loss of Attitude Control
i
Group 9 includes those hazards where the inability to achieve stabiliza-
tion for any reason prevails, such as lack of or intermittent RCS operation
and CG shift during rotation. This group also includes the conditions where
application or release of tension loads causes instability within the con-
figuration for any time duration without damping.
Hazard Group 10 - Loss of Habitable Environment
Group 10 includes any hazards which would render the manned volume unfit
for unsuited occupancy, such as decompression by penetration, long-term leakage
or seal failures which give unscheduled depletion of oxygen supply, contamina-
tion, heat, humidity, and loss of C02 control.
Hazard Group 11 - Loss of Communication
Group 11 includes loss of ability to send or receive programmed data under
operational conditions. It encompasses radio, radar, laser, TV, and hard wire
communications and necessary equipment, GSE, facilities, or satellites associ-
ated with the communication process.
Hazard Group 12 - Disturbances
Group 12 includes those conditions which can adversely affect stability
conditions, such as sloshing and CG shift coupled with the dynamics of the
vehicle or configuration, with RCS interaction, with tank inlet fluid momentum
distorting the liquid surface, or with combinations initiating such conditions,
including impact and wobble.
2.1.1.3 Mission Phase
The mission phase block describes briefly the operation or group of
operations taking place when the hazard occurs that the GLR is to prevent.
These phases or events are described below.
a. All will be used when the GLR applies to any propellant logistics
operation that is performed on the ground, during ascent, or in
orbit.
b. Deployment consists of those functional steps that are to be per-
formed to remove a propellant logistics element from the transport
vehicle.
c. Docking includes those operations performed to effect a mating, or
joining, of two orbiting vehicles.
d. EVA (extra vehicular activity) is that activity taking place outside
the prime vehicle within a separate life support system (suit) that
may or may not be connected by umbilicals to the prime vehicle.
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e. Ground operations are those steps or functions performed on the ground
to support the launch of a vehicle or to render assistance to an
orbiting vehicle.
f. Launch consists of those steps taken to transport a propellant
logistics element from the ground into orbit.
g. Manned operations are those functions performed with human assistance.
h. Manned orbital operations are those functions performed in orbit with
human assistance.
i. Orbital assembly is the construction, in orbit, of a large assembly
of elements that are transported to orbit individually by the trans-
port vehicle.
j. Orbital maintenance refers to those repairs made to a vehicle while
in orbit. Maintenance by machine is not ruled out, but the prime
concern in this type event is the performance of orbital maintenance
by man.
k. Orbital operations are those steps or functions performed upon or
with orbiting propellant logistics elements.
1. Prelaunch activity is that activity performed upon propellant
logistics elements to prepare them for the launch operation.
m. Propellant transfer is the act of transferring propellants from one
tank to another. In the modular case, it would be the transposition
of a propellant module from one position to another.
n. Re-entry is the act of transporting a vehicle from orbit to earth.
Sometimes de-orbit is used interchangeably with re-entry.
o. Retrieval includes all those steps taken to remove an orbital element
from a stationkeeping mode alongside a transport vehicle and to place
the element in the cargo bay and prepare it for re-entry.
p. Sub-orbital abort consists of those steps taken from the time that a
transport vehicle fails to achieve earth orbit, for whatever reason,
until the transport vehicle lands.
2.1.1.4 Applicable Subsystems
In this block will be entered the systems or functions that the stated
guideline will affect. The terms used are in common use throughout the
industry and need not be defined here.
2.1.1.5 Guideline Title
This is the verbal identifier for the GLR.
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2.1.1.6 Guideline Statement
This block contains the full GLR statement.
2.1.1.7 Remarks
A narrative statement of supporting data, further justification, or
elaboration of the GLR statement is entered in this block.
2.1.1.8 References
The source of information that made the guideline statement necessary
is entered in this block. Hazard analysis references will be entered as
HA 12, which corresponds to Hazard Analysis Sheet 12. Literature references
are in parenthesis and (69) would refer to that numbered document listed in
Appendix H of Volume III of this report.
2.1.1.9 Cross References
The numbers of the additional GLR that support the guideline statement
are entered in this block.
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3.0 APPLICATION OF SYSTEM SAFETY GUIDELINES/REQUIREMENTS
Guidelines/Requirements (GLR's) are applied according to two methods:
Examples of the two methods are developed in this section. Figure 4.1-1
presents the results of this development. GLR's are identified as applicable
to the design or operational phase, or both, in the column headed "Type of
GLR" in Figure 4.1-1.
3.1 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
In the development of a concept, the GLR can be used to provide the
optimum degree of safety in propellant logistics design and operations. One
of the requirements of the study was to develop GLR's for prelaunch and launch
(including ascent), orbital operations and lunar operations. GLR's have been
written for any concept developed for use in these three broad areas.
3.1.1 Prelaunch and Launch (Including Ascent)
The distinguishing features of this area of operations are the presence
of gravity (earth gravity or that induced by acceleration) and an atmosphere
that includes oxygen. The appropriate GLR's for the development of a concept
to be used under these conditions are listed in Column 3.1.1 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.1.2 Orbital Operations (Including Earth and Lunar Orbit)
The distinguishing features of this area of operations are the absence
or great reduction of gravity and atmosphere (including the absence of readily
available oxygen). In the development of a concept to be used under these
conditions, the GLR's that should be taken into consideration are listed in
Column 3.1.2 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.1.3 Lunar Operations
The distinguishing features of operating on the lunar surface are the
presence of a significant gravitational force and the absence or great reduc-
tion of atmosphere (including oxygen). In the development of a concept to be
used in lunar operations, the GLR's that should be considered are listed in
Column 3.1.3 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2 DESIGN CHECKLIST
GLR's can be used to verify that the optimum degree of safety has been
incorporated into existing designs, as demonstrated in Figure 3.2-1. This
figure portrays several propellant logistics concepts and the different
requirements of four orbital operations. The vertical columns have been
numbered, and the horizontal rows have been alphabetized in such a way that
A.2.2 would be the operation of "remote hard dock CIS to LSF" under the base-
line concept. The development of Figure 3.2-1 is discussed in Section 2.1
of Volume III of this report.
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3.2.1 Guidelines/Requirements Common to all Orbital Operations
The GLR's that are common to any of the orbital operations in Figure 3.2-1
are listed in Column 3.2.1 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2 Guidelines/Requirements Unique to Orbital Operations
The additional GLR's that apply to specific operations are tabulated in
Figure 4.1-1. Reference is made to Figure 3.2-1 for the identification of
the operation in progress.
3.2.2.1 A-l-1 Concept - Baseline
Operation - Propellant Tank Module Deployed by Manipulators
from Cargo Bay
During this operation, the shuttle orbiter has delivered a propellant
module to orbital altitude. The orbiting propellant depot has been assembled
in orbit, and the shuttle is stationkeeping, with cargo bay doors open, and
is ready to deliver a propellant module. Deployment will consist of those
steps to be taken to sever the interface of the module and shuttle and to
remove the module from the cargo bay by the use of manipulators.
Since this is largely a manual operation, common GLR 57 (Automatic
Operation) is applicable to supporting systems; and common GLR's 49 (Crew
Fatigue), 61 (Crew Training), and 62 (Procedures Development), are applicable.
Additions to the applicable common GLR's are listed in Column 3.2.2.1
of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.2 A-2-1 Concept - Baseline
Operation - Shuttle Soft Docks Propellant Tank Module to
LSF (Large Storage Facility)
During this operation, the shuttle is stationkeeping with the LSF, with
the propellant module on the extended manipulator arms. The manipulator
arms are used to soft dock the module and rigidize it to the LSF. Then the
orbiter translates away from the LSF/module combination. Included in this
operation is the requirement to maintain vehicle stability while the element
is attached to the manipulator arms.
This operation is largely manual, since vehicle stability is critical.
Common GLR 57 (Automatic Operations) is applicable to supporting systems and
GLR 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations), 33 (Fluid Sloshing, 34 (Non-Propulsive
Vents), 49 (Crew Fatigue), 61 (Crew Training), and 62 (Procedures Develop-
ment should be emphasized.
Additions to the common GLR that should be applied are listed in Column
3.2.2.2 of Figure 4.1-1.
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3.2.2.3 A-2-2 Concept - Baseline
Operation - Remote Hard Dock CIS (Chemical Interorbital
Shuttle) to LSF
During this operation, the CIS will automatically dock with no manned
assistance. Of significance is the large mass of both vehicles. Additional
consideration would be given to momentum and the possible excursion of
residual CIS propellants from one end of the tank to the other during the
docking impact. The passive vehicle is the LSF; the active vehicle is the
CIS.
Since this is an unmanned operation, the GLR's that deal with the support
of man in orbit do not apply. The common GLR's that should receive emphasis
include 53 (Manual Override), 57 (Automatic Operations), 52 (Operations
Monitor), and 63 (Malfunction Detection and Warning Devices).
Additions to the common GLR that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.3 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.4 A-3-1 Concept - Baseline
Operation - Rotational Acceleration of LSF for Propellant
Settling—CIS/RNS (Re-usable Nuclear Shuttle)—
Orbiter Unattached
During this operation, the LSF and CIS/RNS have docked, the interface
has been rigidized, and pretransfer operations have been completed. Rotational
acceleration is initiated by firing the RCS of the coupled elements to achieve
the necessary rotational speed to settle the propellants.
Since this is an automatic propellant transfer, automatic operations are
emphasized. Common GLR's that should receive emphasis are 53 (Manual Over-
ride), 57 Automatic Operations, 52 (Operations Monitor), and 63 (Malfunction
Detection and Warning Devices.
Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.4 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.5 A-4-1 Concept - Baseline
Operation - Propellant Tank Retrieval—Emplacement in Cargo
Bay and Deorbit of Orbiter
During this operation, the orbiter stationkeeps with the stable LSF,
removes the empty module from the LSF, translates away, positions the module
in the cargo bay, makes necessary verification tests, closes the doors and
deorbits. The stability of the module while on the manipulator arms and the
influence of residual propellants are primary concerns.
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Retrieval operations are largely manual, and associated common GLR's will
receive the same emphasis as in A-l-1 above. The preparation for deorbit and
the deorbit phase are critical to the orbiter and crew, and the applicable
GLR's are listed in Column 3.2.2.5 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.6 B-2-1 Concept - Orbiter/Tug/LSF
Operation - Remote Hard Dock Tug/Module to LSF
Once a baseline concept has been established, modifications to that
baseline will introduce other hazards that must be countered with additional
GLR's. The new elements that have been added by this operation are the
remote automatic docking of a small mass (tug) to a large mass (LSF). The
common GLR that should be emphasized is 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations).
Additions to the common GLR that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.6 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.7 C-2-1 Concept - Booster/ESS (Expendable Second Stage) Large
Propellant Tank
Operation - Remote Hard Dock of Large Propellant Tank with
CIS/RNS
The added operation is the remote, automatic docking of a large tank
with another large mass (CIS/RNS) after the tank has been boosted by the
ESS. Common GLR 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations) should be emphasized.
Additions to the common GLR that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.7 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.8 D-3-1 Concept - Orbiter to Orbiter
Operation - Flex Lines used by Attaching at QD (Quick
Disconnect) with use of Manipulators
During this operation the additional elements are the stationkeeping
of two orbiters and the use of manipulators to hook up flex lines in
preparation for propellant transfer.
Common GLR's that should receive emphasis are 32 (Uncontrolled Oscilla-
tions), 29 (Ejected Material), 49 (Crew Fatigue), 61 (Crew Training), and
62 (Procedures Development).
3.2.2.9 D-3-2 Concept - Orbiter to Orbiter
Operation - Positive Displacement Method Used for Propellant
Transfer
The additional element in this operation is the introduction of bladders
or diaphragms for fluid expulsion. The requirement to maintain stabilization
and orbiter spacing and the common GLR's are the same as for D-3-1 above.
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Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.9 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.10 E-l-1 Concept - Orbiter to Tug
Operation - Propellant Tank Module Deployed by Rotational
Deployment Mechanism
During this operation, the rotation devices are introduced to deploy a
propellant module out of the cargo bay of the shuttle. An item of concern
is the lateral stability of the module while it is being rotated out of the
cargo bay. The common GLR 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations) should be emphasized,
Additions to the common GLR that should be applied are listed in Column
3.2.2.10 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.11 E-3-1 Concept - Orbiter to Tug
Operation - Rotational Acceleration for Propellant Settling
with Orbiter Attached
For this operation, the orbiter remains attached to serve as a counter-
weight while propellants are transferred from a module to a tug. Of signifi-
cance is the fact that the orbiter crew remains relatively inactive for long
periods (ten-hour transfer time) and is subject to any instability introduced
by the assembly that might be detrimental to human performance.
For this operation, common GLR's 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations) and 49
(Crew Fatigue) should receive emphasis.
Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.11 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.12 E-3-2 Concept - Orbiter to Tug
Operation - Linear Acceleration for Propellant Settling
with Orbiter Attached
This combination introduces linear acceleration for extended periods
with low-thrust engines. Again, the orbiter crew is relatively inactive
for ten hours and subject to any instability introduced by the assembly
that might be detrimental to human performance. Common GLR's that receive
emphasis are 32 (Uncontrolled Oscillations, 50 (Redundancy), and 49 (Crew
Fatigue).
Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.12 of Figure 4.1-1.
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3.2.2.13 F-2-1 Concept - Orbiter to CIS/RNS
Operation - Orbiter Hard Docks Propellant Tank Module to
CIS/RNS
During this operation, the orbiter is required to stationkeep with a
modular CIS, remove a module from the cargo bay and soft-dock it to the CIS,
rigidize the module, and translate away. The requirement to maintain con-
trolled orbiter spacing from the CIS makes the common GLR's 32 (Uncontrolled
Oscillations) and 61 (Crew Training) especially important.
Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listen in
Column 3.2.2.13 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.14 G-l-1 Concept - Orbiter to Modular CIS
Operation - Propellant Tank Module Deployed by Rotational
and Manipulator Mechanisms
During this operation, the use of manipulators and rotational modes of
deployment are combined. The common GLR's to be emphasized are 32 (Uncontrolled
Oscillations), 61 (Crew Training), and 62 (Procedures Development).
Additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.14 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.15 F-3-1 Concept - Orbiter to CIS/RNS
Operation - Linear Acceleration for CIS/RNS/Tank Module
Propellant Settling with Orbiter not Attached
During this operation, the assembled CIS or RNS with the tank module
attached is linearly accelerated for long periods of time. The common GLR's
to be emphasized are the same as for E-3-2.
The additions to the common GLR's that should be applied are listed in
Column 3.2.2.15 of Figure 4.1-1.
3.2.2.16 F-3-2 Concept - Orbiter to CIS/RNS
Operation - Capillary Fluid Control for CIS/RNS Tank
Module Propellant Transfer
During this operation, the use of capillary devices is introduced for
propellent settling. Since these devices are static in their operation, no
one common GLR would receive special emphasis.
Applicable GLR's are listed in Column 3.2.2.16 of Figure 4.1-1.
- 15 - SD72-SA-0054-2
Space Division
North American Rockwell
4.0 IN-SPACE PROPELLANT SYSTEM SAFETY (ISPSS) GUIDELINES/REQUIREMENTS
4.1 SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES/REQUIREMENTS
Figure 4.1-1 is a summary of the results of the preceding sections.
This figure contains a complete listing of the GLR's by number and title.
The first two columns headed by "Type of GLR" indicate whether the GLR would
be applied during the design or operational phase, or both. An "X" at the
intersection of the rows and columns indicates the applicability of the
particular GLR during that phase.
The columns headed by 3.1 indicate the applicability of the GLR during
concept development.
The columns headed by 3.2 indicate the applicability of the GLR as a
checklist to determine whether the concept is optimized for safety. An "0"
in these rows and columns indicates a GLR that would be common to any orbital
operation that must be emphasized for a specific orbital mission. These
specific orbital missions are described in the paragraph number at the head
of the column.
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Figure 4.1-1
Summary of the Application of In-Space System Safety (ISPSS) Guidelines/Requirements
GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT
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7. Cargo Bay Hazardous Gas Detectors
8. Ground Purge
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NOTE: A "0" entered in these columns indicates that the Common GLR from Column 3.2.1 should receive
particular emphasis.
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I SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Pressurized Systems
GUIDELINE TITLE: Proof Pressure Tests
STATEMENT: ^L PRESSURIZED CONTAINERS SHALL BE PROOF-TESTED AFTER FABRICATION TO
LEVELS GREATER THAN THEIR OPERATING PRESSURE (HYDROSTAT 1-1/2 TIMES OPERATING,
PNEUMOSTAT 1-1/4 TIMES OPERATING).
REMARKS• The proof test is considered necessary as the final confirmation of design
and fabrication of pressure vessels. At least one representative unit will be life-
tested by pressurizing to operating level or above and relieving the pressure to
ambient for as many cycles as the unit is to be exposed in service.
REFERENCES:
 HA 11, 12, 38, 44, 49, 117 CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE. TITLE: installation Verification
STATEMENT: AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF A PROPELLANT LOGICTICS ELEMENT'IN THE CARGO
BAY OF THE SHUTTLE, VISUAL INSPECTION, LEAK TEST AND ELECTRICAL TESTS SHALL BE
CONDUCTED TO VERIFY THAT THE ELEMENT HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED BY THE INSTALLATION.
REMARKS• Unnoticed damage to insulation, structures or other systems could occur on
ground installation or orbital retrieval and emplacement of the element in the shuttle cargo
bay. Insulation damage could lead to intolerable propellant boil-off and other systems
damage could lead to mission loss from other sources. The post-installation tests should
be used to verify that any system to be used in subsequent operations will successfully
perform its function.
REFERENCES:
HA8
CROSS REFERENCES: 63
- 20 - .SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch, Launch, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Propellant Tanks, Shuttle Interface
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Propellant Leakage into Cargo Bay of Shuttle
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS SHALL BE LEAK CHECKED TO VERIFY THAT THE
LEAKAGE OF HYDROGEN SYSTEMS IS WITHIN SPECIFICATION TOLERANCE PRIOR TO PRE-LAUNCH
LOADING AND PRIOR TO RE-ENTRY FROM ORBIT.
REMARKS: For a complete discussion of the hydrogen leakage problem, refer to Vol III
Section 4.2. The following summarizes the results of this analysis and details the minimum
steps that need to be taken to reduce this hazard.
On the Ground:
1. Perform a leak check on the propellant logistics element prior to placing it in
the cargo bay.
2. Verify that the element/arbiter interface is leak-tight and that no leaks developed
in the element during installation.
3. Provide a ground, inert gas purge to dilute H£ from credible leaks to less than
4% by volume in the cargo bay.
Provide hydrogen, oxygen and fire detectors for the cargo bay.
Provide emergency propellant un-loading capability,
to De-Orbit:
Perform a visual inspection & leak-check of element by TV or through the view
ports, prior to retrieval. Liquid leaks in a hard vacuum are highly visible.
Inspect cargo bay for evidence of propellant "ice."
Install element in cargo bay, leak check element, & interface between transport
vehicle and element.
Dump residual propellants after settling before or after installation.
Verify tank pressure is within structural limits of atmospheric pressure. This
series of leak checks will ensure that any leaks greater than normal are
detected. Normal leakage is not hazardous for the currently considered
propellant logistics elements.
4.
5.
Prior
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
REFERENCES: VOL. Ill, Sec. 4.2.5
(15), (16), (17), (18), (20), (21)
CROSS REFERENCES: ,
Z, 4, D, 0, /,
46, 47, 48, 51, 55, 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch, Docking, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Fluid Line Interface Connections
GUIDELINE TITLE:
Fluid Line Interconnect Verification
STATEMENT: PROVIDE A MEANS TO VERIFY THAT THE FLUID LINES OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS
ELEMENTS ARE CONNECTED AND THAT THE INTERFACE IS LEAK FREE BEFORE FLUIDS ARE
TRANSFERRED.
REMARKS: The fluid connections between propellant logistics elements and between
the module and shuttle are critical to efficient propellant transfer and safe
orbiter return. A partially engaged or leaking fluid interface connection could
lead to the loss of the propellant logistics mission or to fire/explosion in the
cargo bay.
When the fluid lines are connected and rigidized, the monitor shall have verifi-
cation of this fact. Before fluid is transferred, or before re-entry of the shuttle,
the fluid connection shall be verified to be free of hazardous leaks.
REFERENCES: HA 90, 112, 116 CROSS REFERENCES:
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1SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 5
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch, Docking, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Electrical Interface Connections
GUIDELINE TITLE: Electrical Line Interconnect Verification
STATEMENT:
 PROVIDE A MEANS TO VERIFY THAT THE ELECTRICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN PROPELLANT
LOGISTICS ELEMENTS ARE ATTACHED AND THAT THE CONNECTION PROVIDES ELECTRICAL ISOLATION
BETWEEN CONDUCTORS AND CONTINUITY WITHIN CONDUCTORS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO SUBSEQUENT
OPERATIONS.
REMARKS: _.
The electrical connections that will transmit data and control signals
between propellant logistics elements and between the module and shuttle is critical
to propellant transfer and safe orbiter return. A partially engaged electrical inter-
face or intermittent contact or shorts between conductors could lead to loss of control
of subsequent operations or loss of data with which to conduct subsequent operations.
When the electrical interface is connected and rigidized the monitor shall have
verification of this fact and prior to subsequent operations tests shall be conducted
to verify that all electrical conductors have been properly mated.
REFERENCES:
HA 35, 90, 127
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 6
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Ground Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Caution and Warning System
GUIDELINE TITLE: Cargo Bay Fire Detectors
TEMENT:
 FIRE DETECTORS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE CARGO BAY OF THE SHUTTLE
DURING PROPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS.
REMARKS:
Fire detectors that indicate . rising temperature in time to take
corrective action and prevent or minimize fire damage must be provided for the cargo
bay when it contains a propellant logistics element.
REFERENCES:
HA 2
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 7
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Ground Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Caution and Warning System
GUIDELINE TITLE:
Cargo Bay Hazardous Gas Detectors
STATEMENT:
GAS. DETECTORS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO INDICATE THE CONCENTRATION
OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS IN THE CARGO BAY
REMARKS:
During pre-launch operations the gas detectors would provide information
on the presence of leaks that had developed during the loading operation. Procedures
shall be developed that will detail the corrective action to be taken to prevent or
minimize fire damage that could occur as a result of the presence of the hazardous gas.
REFERENCES: ^
 2 CROSS REFERENCES: 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
 8
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Confined Compartments
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Ground Purge
STATEMENT: ALL CONFINED VOLUMES OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS SHALL BE PURGED
WITH AN INERT GAS TO PREVENT THE ACCUMULATION OF EXPLOSIVE PROPELLANT MIXTURES.
REMARKS'
Propellant logistics elements are designed to prevent restricted
volumes.When they are enclosed in restricted volumes such as the cargo bay of the
shuttle normal leakage will, in time, accumulate explosive mixtures. For this reason
restricted volumes should be purged with an inert gas in sufficient volume to prevent
the accumulation of hazardous concentrations of propellants (4% by volume of hydrogen).
Further considerations would be the elimination of pockets or dead spaces that did not
receive purge flow and the protection of pad personnel from suffocation from the large
volumes of inert gas that would be required.
REFERENCES:
161
HA 4, 46, 51, 52, 97, 120, 121,
CROSS REFERENCES: 6, 7
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP:
1, 2
MISSION PHASE:
Pre-launch, Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Facility and Vehicle Vent System
GUIDELINE TITLE:
Expansion of Melting Solid Cryogen
STATEMENT:
FACILITY AND VEHICLE VENT SYSTEMS MUST BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING LIQUID
AND GASEOUS CRYOGENS.
REMARKS: The primary reason for considering the use of slush cryogens in propellant
logistics is the density advantage. For instance, solid hydrogen is 22.4% more dense
than an equivalent weight of liquid hydrogen. The design ullage for propellant
modules is generally 5%. A prolonged delay in the launch or insulation loss leading
to abnormally high heat leaks into the module will melt the solid fraction. The
melting solid would expand and overflow the tank. A vent system would have to be
provided to accommodate the liquid and attendant high volumes of gaseous propellant
that would be produced. One pound of LH2 forms 194.5 ft3 of gas at 25? C and 1
atmosphere. Thus the volume change is approximately 860. This high volume flow in
long vent lines could reflect high back-pressures into the propellant tank and
over-stress the tank.
REFERENCES:
HAS (12), (13)
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 10
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant Tanks and Lines
GUIDELINE TITLE: Solid/Liquid Separation in Slush Cryogens
A MEANS MUST BE PROVIDED TO INSURE A UNIFORM MIXTURE OF THE LIQUID AND
SOLID PHASE OF SLUSH PROPELLANTS DURING PROPELLANT TRANSFER.
REMARKS:
The solid particles of slush propellants are more dense than the liquid portion.
Under the influence of gravity, the solid particles will settle to the bottom of the
container and be the first available for withdrawing by the propellant transfer pumps.
At the worst, this could lead to compaction or bridging of the solid particles and
interruption or total blockage of the propellant flow and inability to control propellant
flow. A total blockage of propellant flow would prevent off-loading propellants
during an emergency, until heat-leaks melted the solid plug. At the least, a non-homo-
genuous mixture of solids and liquids would be transferred.
During ground loading this could lead to the inability to get enough solids in the
propellant module to achieve the required solid fraction and possible compromise of
the mission.
Solid/liquid separation could also occur when the flow velocity is not above a critical
minimum and the solid particles settle to the bottom of the transfer line.
REFERENCES:
HA 4, (52)
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
11
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-Launch, Launch, Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant. Management
GUIDELINE TITLE: Solid Fraction Measurement in Slush Propellants
STATEMENT:
A MEANS MUST BE PROVIDED TO MEASURE THE SOLID FRACTION OF SLUSH
PROPELLANTS IN PROPELLANT LOGISTICS TANKS.
REMARKS:
The solid fraction of slush propellants will expand upon melting. Sufficient ullage
volume will have to be allowed to compensate for this increased volume of liquid
as the solid fraction melts from heat leaks.
If sufficient volume is not available to accomodate the expansion of melting solids
the unscheduled release of liquid/solid mixture could effect vehicle stability,
impinge on surfaces of other vehicles or obscure visual aids.
REFERENCES:
(12), (13)
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
12
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-Launch
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Propellant and Pressurization
GUIDELINE TITLE: Loading, Un-Loading Propellants
STATEMENT:
LIQUID OXYGEN SHALL BE LOADED INTO PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS BEFORE LIQUID
HYDROGEN, FAIL-SAFE EMERGENCY UN-LOADING PROVISIONS SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO
VEHICLE AND FACILITY SYSTEMS.
REMARKS:
The sequence of loading propellants into a dual-propellant logistics module while
in the cargo bay of the shuttle shall be LOX first, then liquid hydrogen.
(Ref. 48)
Should an emergency, such as fire, arise while the transport vehicle is still
on the pad it will be necessary to un-load propellants from the Propellant
Logistics Module. Even though the propellants were loaded in series, emergency
conditions could dictate that the propellants shall be un-loaded in parallel
in order to save time. The un-loading system shall be designed to accomplish
un-loading in the time-limits established by the performance of the same task
on the transport vehicle. As the propellants are drained by gravity and tank
pressure the displaced volume shall be replaced by a compatible gas at a pressure
no greater than that to be used in ascent. If the emergency causes power to
fail to the valves used for un-loading, tank pressurization and the provision
of Ground Purge, 8, the system shall fail to a-safe mode of operation.
REFERENCES:
HA7 (48)
CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 13
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Pre-Launch, Launch, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant, Pressurization
GUIDELINE TITLE: Negative Tank Pressure
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT TANK SYSTEMS MUST BE DESIGNED TO AVOID FAILURE FROM NEGATIVE
TANK PRESSURE.
REMARKS:
During the pre-launch and launch preparations a planned or inadvertent propellant
dump could lower the ullage pressure of the tank and lead to collapse of the
tank structure if a fail-safe means of re-pressurizing the tank with a compatible gas
were not incorporated. Tank collapse would dump large quantities of propellants into
the cargo bay and cause the loss of the transport vehicle & crew by fire or explosion.
During the preparations for shuttle de-orbit the tank pressure of the module must
be verified to be within structural limits of atmospheric pressure before committing
to de-orbit. Tank collapse when the transport vehicle reaches the sensible atmosphere
could cause massive leaks of hydrogen that would mix with atmospheric oxygen inside
the cargo bay and be ignited by heat, shock, or catalytic action and lead to the loss
of the transport vehicle and crew. If the tank pressure cannot be verified to be
acceptable it shall not be returned in the transport vehicle.
REFERENCES: HA 1, 71, 85, 87 CROSS REFERENCES:
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 14
HAZARD GROUP: 1, 2 MISSION PHASE: Launch
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant and Pressurization
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Sub-Orbital Abort
STATEMENT: IN CASE OF ORBITER SUB-ORBITAL ABORT THE PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENT
SHALL HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SAFELY DUMP PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
40,000 LB. ORBITER LANDING LIMITATIONS IN THE MINIMUM TIME (ORBITER
FLIGHT TIME) AVAILABLE FOR PROPELLANT DUMPING.
REMARKS:
In case of a booster failure prior to staging the orbiter must have intact abort
capability. The orbiter has the ability to land with a 40 k Lb. payload .
Heavier payloads can be landed with a reduced factor of safety. If
the propellant logistics element is the orbiter cargo and weighs more than 40 K Lb.
it must dump propellants to reduce weight. If the element contains both propellants
or LOX only it would be preferable to dump LOX because it is more dense and incombustible.
If the module contains hydrogen only and dumping is necessary the orbiter dump lines
must be designed to prevent back-diffusion of atmospheric oxygen into the hydrogen
lines/tanks. The orbiter flight attitude must be optimized to minimize the affect
of the trailing, and probably burning, cloud of hydrogen. The time available for
dumping, in the worst case, will be approximately 200 sec. This minimum time is
established by the orbiter flight time between the beginning of the abort sequence
and landing.
REFERENCES: HA 76, 77 CROSS REFERENCES: 12, 13, 48
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 15
HAZARD GROUP: i MISSION PHASE:
Sub-Orbital Abort, Re-Entry
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Vent/Dump System
GUIDELINE TITLE: Vent/Dump System
STATEMENT: FOR TRANSPORTING- PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS.WITHIN. ITS CARGO
BAY, THE ORBITER MUST PROVIDE A CLOSED VENT/DUMP .SYSTEM WHICH
TERMINATES OUTSIDE THE CARGO BAY AND WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH
THE LOGISTICS ELEMENT.
REMARKS:
Tank vents systems must be provided for the elements that allow the tanks to vent
outside the cargo bay. This venting system must be capable of passing the gas that
might be generated in the propellant tanks without over-stressing the tank.
Under zero "G" conditions local hot spots could develop because of heat leaks through
lost or damaged insulation. When the propellant tank again came under the influence
of gravity while in the cargo bay the residual liquid propellants could contact the hot
spot and rapidly flash into vapor. The vent valves and lines must be large enough
to prevent this pressure increase from over-pressurizing the tank.
When the vehicle has common vent and dump line the line will be sized to permit dumping
the required amount of liquid in the minimum amount of time available for dumping.
The line size to be installed will be governed by the maximum size required to vent
the gases or dump the liquids, whichever is larger.
REFERENCES: HA 76 CROSS REFERENCES: 3, 4, 14, 28, 47, 48
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 16
HAZARD GROUP:
 10 MISSION PHASE: Manned Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Life Support System (LSS)
GUIDELINE. TITLE: contamination of LSS
STATEMENT: THE LSS OF MANNED PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS SHALL NOT PRODUCE
TOXIC PRODUCTS OR BECOME CONTAMINATED BY TOXIC PRODUCTS FROM EXTERNAL
SOURCES *
REMARKS:
The life support system of orbital storage depots must be designed for long-term use,
or periods of intermitten use over long periods. These systems must not generate within
themselves products that would be harmful to man or be subject to the introduction of
harmful products from sources external to themselves. Prior to the use or reuse of
such a LSS it must be verified to be operable and capable of supporting the crew without
introducing toxic products.
o
VO
REFERENCES: HA33 CROSS REFERENCES: 56
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
 17
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Life Support
GUIDELINE TITLE:
 EVA Operations
STATEMENT:
EVA SHALL BE MINIMIZED DURING ORBITAL PROPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS.
REMARKS:
Propellant.logistics systems shall not be designed or operated to require EVA for mission
completion.
As a critical part of the man/machine system the elements that deal with mans protection in
the space environment should have the same or greater level of redundancy as other critical
elements in this system. Such is not the case with elements associated with EVA. There is
no second pressurized volume to which the man could retreat in the event the first volume (suit)
loses oxygen pressure because of rupture, puncture, or rips or umbilicals becoming fouled
or kinked on obstructions. The decision to go EVA should be made where the benefits to
be derived are commensurate with the risk to the crewman.
REFERENCES: Study Ground Rules HA 70 CROSS REFERENCES: is, 19, 60
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 18
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: Orbital Assembly,
Orbital Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Manned Activation
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS WHICH ARE DESIGNED FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION
SHALL INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR LOCAL, MANUAL CONTROL DURING ACTIVATION,
EMERGENCY OR MAINTENANCE.
REMARKS:
After the assembly of orbital storage facilities, or after maintenance of these facilities
the initial operation shall be verified by using local control. If the operation to be
conducted could introduce hazards to crewmen in the immediate vicinity, the control of
this operation shall be exercised at a stand-off distance that is great enough to
eliminate this hazard.
REFERENCES:
HA60
CROSS REFERENCES:
53
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 19
HAZARD GROUP:
 10 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 A11 Maintainable Elements
GUIDELINE TITLE: Maintenance Crew Support
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS SHALL PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH
CAN BE MADE HABITABLE IN ALL AREAS THAT CONTAIN COMPONENTS THAT ARE
SUBJECT TO FREQUENT ORBITAL MAINTENANCE.
REMARKS:
To minimize the requirement for EVA, those components that have a high maintenance rate
should be repairable in a shirtsleeve environment.
REFERENCES: HA60, Study Ground Rules CROSS REFERENCES: 18, 21
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 20
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Assembly, Orbit, Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 All
GUIDELINE. TITLE:propellant Logistics Element Attach Points
STATEMENT: POSITIVE ATTACH POINTS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR INSTALLING A PROPELLANT
LOGISTICS ELEMENT IN A CARGO BAY WHICH DOES NOT PERMIT ANY MATING
MISALIGNMENT OF THE LINE INTERCONNECT FIXTURE.
REMARKS:
Precise alignment of the line interconnect fixture is necessary to ensure that
fluid connectors are leak-free and electrical connectors make contact between the
shuttle and propellant modules. Orbital re-adjustments of this fixed relationship
shall be eliminated by providing fixed attach points.
REFERENCES: HA 64, 72, 90 CROSS REFERENCES:
- 38 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 21
HAZARD GROUP: 10 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Maintenance in Restricted Areas
STATEMENT: NO ORBITAL MAINTENANCE SHALL BE CONDUCTED BY A SUITED CREWilAN IN
VOLUMES THAT DO NOT ALLOW FOR HIS RAPID RESCUE
REMARKS:
Any orbital maintenance by.a crewman in a suit must include the possibility of
requiring his rescue. EVA is a critical operation and working in confined spaces
exposes him to increased hazards. These confined spaces would include the interior
of propellant tanks, locations between the shuttle cargo and the cargo bay walls, or
any space where the crewman does not have freedom of movement when encumbered by his
suit or could readily be rescued by his buddy.
REFERENCES: HA60 CROSS REFERENCES: 17, 19
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 22
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Deployment, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Power Removal Prior to Connector Operation
STATEMENT: ALL ELECTRICAL POWER SHALL BE REMOVED FROM ELECTRICAL
CONNECTORS AND FLUID PRESSURE SHALL BE REMOVED FROM FLUID
CONNECTORS PRIOR TO ENGAGEMENT OR DISENGAGEMENT.
REMARKS:
Electrical Connectors:
Electrical power should be removed from the conductors at a connector to minimize
the possibility of sparking, arcing or welding of contacts by inadvertent shorting,
prior to connecting or disconnecting. A connector should not be used as a switch.
The ground contact of connectors should be the first one made and the last one broken.
Fluid Connectors:
Fluid connectors of the quick disconnect type shall be of the self-sealing type to
minimize leakage or spillage. Any fluid connection that is not of the self-sealing
type shall not be broken when the line contains fluid.
REFERENCES: HA 63 CROSS REFERENCES: 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 23
HAZARD GROUP:
 2 10 MISSION PHASE: Deployment, Docking, Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Reaction Control Systems
GUIDELINE TITLE: Reaction Control Interface
STATEMENT:
 THE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE PASSIVE VEHICLE SHALL BE DEACTIVATED
OR INTEGRATED WITH THE ACTIVE VEHICLE AS SOON AS VEHICLES ARE CAPTURED
DURING DOCKING.
REMARKS:
As the supplier and user vehicles become captured prior to rigidizing during docking,
the two vehicles can affect each other's attitude. If the reaction control system of
the passive vehicle is not deactivated or synchronized with that of the active vehicle,
the two RCS's could oppose each other. This would lead to high structural loads,
possible structural damage at the docking interface as well as rapid depletion of RCS
propellants.
o
ID
REFERENCES: (69) CROSS REFERENCES: 31
S-D72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 24
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
 Docking
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Docking
GUIDELINE TITLE: Docking to Unstable Vehicles
STATEMENT: DOCKING SHALL NOT BE ATTEMPTED BETWEEN VEHICLES THAT ARE NOT STABLE IN
RELATION TO EACH OTHER
REMARKS:
Docking mechanisms will be designed to accept a limited amount of linear and angular
deviation between the docking axes of the two vehicles. Any attempt to dock two
vehicles that are moving in relation to each other could exceed the linear and angular
tolerance and result in accidental impact or failure to capture. Consideration shall
be given to automatic control of docking (with manual override) with inhibit circuitry
to prevent attempts to dock vehicles whose motion cannot be synchronized.
REFERENCES: HA17, 88, 96, 107
CROSS REFERENCES: 57
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 25
HAZARD GROUP: 12 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Manipulators
GUIDELINE TITLE: Manipulator Operation
STATEMENT: ENERGY LIMITING DEVICES SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO MANIPULATOR
POWER SOURCES. SYNCHRONIZED AND INDEPENDENT OPERATING CAPABILITY
SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR DUAL MANIPULATOR USE.
REMARKS:
Manipulator operation will be a manually controlled operation. To prevent the
introduction of moments great enough to cause vehicle instability the energy
that can be imparted by the manipulator should be limited by limiting the closing
velocity to be compatible with the mass of the vehicles involved.
When an element is being deployed out of the cargo bay by two manipulators they
shall be synchronized to prevent the rotation of the element about its roll axis.
When the manipulators are being used to soft dock two vehicles together they shall
be capable of independent motion.
Propulsive vents on propellant modules shall be held closed while the module is on
the manipulator arms (with the monitor observing tank pressure to correct over
pressure) to prevent the propulsive effects of unscheduled venting which could cause
impact between vehicles.
REFERENCES: HA 23, 24, 25, 36, 37, 56,
66, 78, 85, 91, 92, 97
CROSS REFERENCES: 49, 61, 62
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 26
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:• Engine, Capillary Devices
G U I D E L I N E TITLE: Operating With Slush Propellants
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT LOGISTICS SYSTEMS THAT UTILIZE SLUSH
PROPELLANTS MUST BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING WITH
VARYING SOLID FRACTIONS.
REMARKS:
Heat leaks into tanks will melt the solid fraction of slush propellants. The percentage
of solid remaining will diminish from a maximum of approximately 50% to 0% as a
direct function of time and heat flux.
Engine performance will vary if it is fed propellants whose solid content varies.
Additionally, solid particles will block small engine orifices and could lead to
local hot spots and overheating or engine loss.
The small openings of capillary propellant settling devices will be restricted or blocked
by the solid particles in slush. For this reason capillary devices shall not be used
with slush propellants.
REFERENCES: (76) CROSS REFERENCES: n
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 27
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant Tanks
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Evaporative Freezing of Bulk Liquids
STATEMENT:
 BULK QUANTITIES OF LIQUIDS SHALL NOT BE EXPOSED TO VACUUM FOR
EXTENDED PERIODS.
REMARKS:
When liquids are exposed to pressures below the triple point pressure and the vent
opening is below a limiting fraction of the liquid surface area, some liquid will
evaporate and solidify a substantial portion of the remaining liquid. The solid will
require an extended time to sublime if it remains in a vacuum, or if subsequently
re-pressurized, will require an extended time to melt to a liquid. The presence of
the undetected solid could create a hazard to subsequent operations such as maneuvers
of re-entry.
REFERENCES: 17 CROSS REFERENCES: 55
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 28
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Vent Lines, Dump Lines
GUIDELINE TITLE: Clogging of Manifolds With Frozen Propellents
STATEMENT: A MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PREVENT THE ACCUMULATION OF SOLIDIFIED
PROPELLANTS IN VENT OR DUMP LINES DISCHARGING INTO VACUUM.
REMARKS:
The discharge of liquids from vent lines into vacuum produces solids when a portion of
the liquid evaporates and freezes the remainder of the liquid. These solids can build
up around and restrict the exit area. Plugs can form if the flow is intermittent.
When the liquid expands on freezing these plugs can completely block the line to
subsequent flow.
REFERENCES:
20
CROSS REFERENCES:
- 46 -
48
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 29
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Fluid Systems
GUIDELINE TITLE: Ejected Material
STATEMENT: DIRECT IMPINGEMENT OF EJECTED MATERIAL ON VEHICLE SURFACES SHALL
BE AVOIDED IN THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS
SYSTEMS.
REMARKS:
Products of combustion exhausted from RCS, GG and main engines; propellant, water and
urine dumps; vented gases and leaking propellants are some of the contamination sources
to be expected during orbital propellant logistics operations. The effluents from these
sources characteristically expand radially outward at high velocities in a 180° flattened
hemisphere and quickly condense into small particles. When these particles impinge on
vehicle surfaces they can build up until sublimed by heat. This build up can block or
restrict visual aids. On all vehicles the propulsive effect must be countered by the
RCS, or the exits made non-propulsive. If propellants build up on returning modules
or in the cargo bay, they could sublime and form explosive mixtures in the cargo bay
on re-entry.
The thermal effects of direct plume impingement on vehicle surfaces can have catastrophic
results. High temperature exhaust gases from RCS or other engines can destroy vehicle
surfaces not designed to withstand these high temperatures. Cold vent gases or cryo-
genic liquids are other extreme conditions that can damage vehicle surfaces by thermal
shock.
REFERENCES: (4A) CROSS REFERENCES: 3, 30, 34, 46, 51,
56
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 30
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 View Ports and Optical Lenses
GUIDELINE TITLE: Protection of Visual Aids
STATEMENT: RETRACTIBLE SHIELDS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR CRITICAL VISUAL AIDS
THAT COULD BE SUBJECT TO CONTAMINATION OR METEOROID BOMBARDMENT
REMARKS:
Venting or leaking fluids expand, at high velocity, radially outward from the source.
These fluids quickly freeze into "ice" and adhere to surfaces they contact. To prevent
this accumulation from restricting or blocking vision through viewports or TV lenses,
these visual aids shall be provided with retractable covers to be used to protect
them during periods when they could be obscured. Long term exposure to meteoroid
bombardment could also reduce visibility and the shields shall be used during high
density meteoroid showers.
REFERENCES:
HA115
CROSS REFERENCES: 35,56
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 31
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Reaction Control System (RCS)
GUIDELINE TITLE: RCS Capability
STATEMENT: THE RCS OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS, OR COMBINATION OF
ELEMENTS, SHALL BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THE STABILITY OF
PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS UNDER ALL CONDITIONS.
REMARKS:
The RCS is the prime means of establishing and maintaining the stability of orbital
units or assembly of units. When the elements have been designed to be inherently
stable there are forces that would tend to upset this stability if not counteracted
by the RCS. Among these forces would be:
1. Docking impact
2. Fluid sloshing
3. Uncoordinated RCS action between docked vehicles
4. Propulsive venting
5. Propulsive effect of leaking propellants
6. CG migration
7. Dynamic coupling or overall vehicle dynamics
8. Intermittent propellant supply or lack of propellants to RCS
In the final design, all of these subjects shall be fully investigated and resolved
in the design process.
REFERENCES: HA 17, 39, 41, 46, 99, 105 CROSS REFERENCES: 23, 32, 33, 34, 41
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I SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 32
HAZARD GROUP: 2, 8, 9, 12 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Shock Absorbers, Slosh Control, RCS
GUIDELINE TITLE: Uncontrolled Oscillations
STATEMENT: WHEN PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS ARE JOINED OR BEING JOINED THE
STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE CONFIGURATION SHALL BE CONTROLLED TO PREVENT
DISTURBANCES WHICH ARE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SYSTEMS OR CREW.
REMARKS:
Disturbances must not be allowed to build up to the point that human or systems performance
is degraded. Some factors that would tend to cause disturbances are:
1. Docking impact - both momentum and resulting fluid excursion
2. Fluid sloshing
3. Uncoordinated RCS action between docking or docked vehicles
4. Propulsive venting
5. Propulsive effect of leaking propellants
6. C.G. migration
7. Dynamic coupling or overall vehicle dynamics
8. Intermittent, or depleted propellants to RCS
REFERENCES:
HA 120, 166
CROSS REFERENCES:
- 50 -
31
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 33
HAZARD GROUP:
 8, 12 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: slosh Control
GUIDELINE TITLE:
Fluid Sloshing
STATEMENT: SLOSH PREVENTING AND DAMPING DEVICES SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
PROPELLANT TANKS OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS.
REMARKS:
Fluid sloshing under the conditions encountered in propellant logistics operations
remains one of the largest contributors to vehicle instability. The design process
must include a study of the ways that fluid sloshing is introduced and establish
means to ensure that sloshing is not started or minimized and does not contribute
to vehicle instability.
REFERENCES: HA4, 46, 51, 52, 97, 120, 121,
161
CROSS REFERENCES: 24, 25, 31, 39,
41, 42
• - 51 - SD72-SA-0054-2
I SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 34
HAZARD GROUP: 2, 9 MISSION PHASE: Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Vents, Exhaust Outlets
GUIDELINE TITLE: Non-Propulsive Vents
STATEMENT: EXHAUST GAS AND TANK VENT OUTLETS OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS
SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT THE PROPULSIVE EFFECT OF VENTING FLUIDS
WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE ELEMENTS.
REMARKS:
The design process must evaluate the placement and pointing direction of venting fluids.
The unscheduled propulsive venting of the tanks on a single element could impart an
acceleration that would create vehicle instability, jeopardizing the trajectory of the
element or causing impact on neighboring vehicles. When elements are joined for transfer
the ejected materials could impact on visual aids and cause hazards to vision. During
the docking operation propulsive venting could change the approach velocity and cause
accidental impact or failure to capture.
o10
REFERENCES:
HA22, 125, 159
CROSS REFERENCES:
31
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 35
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Orbiting Debris
STATEMENT: THE COLLISION OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS WITH SPACE
DEBRIS SHALL BE AVOIDED BY THE CHOICE OF LAUNCH WINDOW AND
ORBITAL FLIGHT PATH.
REMARKS:
Ground tracking radar information can provide a launch window to enable propellant
logistics elements to be timed to miss space debris that is detectible by such radar.
Once an element achieves orbit, the bigger it is and the longer it stays in orbit
increases the probability of being struck and damaged by orbiting debris. Reference
12A, Volume III, Appendix H, cites a probability of 0.002 for a space station
(approximately the size of a large storage facility) orbiting at a 200 nautical mile
altitude being struck by debris of 5 feet to 30 feet in size within ten years. If
other debris were included the probability would increase. The hazard of propellant
logistics elements being struck by debris is a residual one and continued effort
must be expended to reduce it.
o
vO
REFERENCES: HA 15, 103, (12A) CROSS REFERENCES: 36
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 36
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Orbital Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
All Exposed Elements
GUIDELINE TITLE: Meteoroid Shields
STATEMENT: METEOROID SHIELDS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR CRITICAL COMPONENTS
AND SYSTEMS OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS.
REMARKS:
The impact of meteoroids on propellant logistics elements can reach a high
probability depending on orbital altitude, size of element, and orbital stay time.
A meteoroid shield that will absorb the impact of meteoroids of one gram mass with
velocities of 25 - 30 km/sec is considered the minimum protection for critical
components.
REFERENCES: HA 14, 43, 153, 157, (12A) CROSS REFERENCES: 30
- 54 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 37
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 User Propellant Tanks and Lines
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Chilldown
STATEMENT:
THE USER PROPELLANT TANKS AND LINES SHALL BE COOLED DOWN SLOWLY TO
REDUCE THE THERMAL SHOCK OF FULL CRYOGENIC FLOW.
REMARKS:
A sudden transition from a relatively warm, empty state to cryogenic temperatures could
introduce stresses in the user propellant tanks or lines that would exceed their design
limits. The results could be catastrophic and require the return of the vehicle for ground
repairs.
o
vO
REFERENCES:
HA3, 133, 162
CROSS REFERENCES:
- 55 -
55, 56
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 38
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant Transfer Lines
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Velocity Head Suppression
STATEMENT: A MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO SUPPRESS VELOCITY HEAD DURING PROPELLANT
TRANSFER OPERATIONS TO PREVENT OVER PRESSURIZATION.
REMARKS:
In the case of propellant transfer by pumping expulsion the sudden closure of valves in
the discharge line could subject the discharge lines to pressures that exceed the design
limit. To eliminate excessive pressure the design of the propellant transfer system
should include some method of preventing this occurrence or absorbing it if it did occur.
Electrical interlocks between the pump and valves would prevent this occurrence or
surge chambers would absorb the pressure.
REFERENCES: (31) CROSS REFERENCES: 29 5g
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 39
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Propellant Settling
GUIDELINE TITLE: Vapor Pull-Through
STATEMENT: ANTI-VORTEX OR OTHER DEVICES SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN TANK OUTLETS
TO MINIMIZE VAPOR PULL-THROUGH DURING PROPELLANT TRANSFER OPERATIONS.
REMARKS * Vapor pull-through can introduce variations in propellant flow. Alternate
liquid and vapor could be introduced into discharge lines and produce variations in
residual propellants.
The performance of gas generators, pumps, RCS or other units that utilize propellants
from the main tanks would be adversely affected by intermittent gas and liquid flow.
It is for these reasons that effective liquid/vapor interface control be implemented
and vapor pull-through be minimized.
REFERENCES: HA 82, 119, 166 CROSS REFERENCES: 41, 42
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 40
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Gas Generator
GUIDELINE TITLE: Gas Generator Safety Devices
STATEMENT: SAFETY DEVICES SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE GAS GENERATOR OUTLET TO
REDUCE OR TERMINATE PROPELLANT FLOW TO THE GG IF EITHER TEMPERATURE OR
PRESSURE BECOMES EXCESSIVE OR UNSTABLE.
REMARKS:
Gas generators characteristically operate fuel-rich as compared to an engine
designed to produce thrust. If the fuel supply is interrupted or reduced the output
pressure and temperature go up. If the fuel supply is stopped the hot engine is
quickly destroyed by oxidation.
o
10
REFERENCES: HA 48, 50, 118, 123 CROSS REFERENCES: 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 41
HAZARD GROUP: 2, 7, 8, 9 MISSION PHASE: Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Propellant Tanks
GUIDELINE TITLE: .RCS & Gas Generator Propellant Accumulator
STATEMENT: A MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF PROPELLANTS
TO THE RCS AND GAS GENERATOR.
REMARKS: When the RCS or gas generator utilizes propellants from the main tank to
produce thrust to settle the propellants under zero "G" conditions, liquid propellant
will not be available or will be available intermittently on start-up. Accumulators,
"start-boxes" or other devices shall be incorporated to insure the availability of
liquid propellants at the device during start-up.
When RCS propellants are supplied from the main tanks propellant transfer to the user
could deplete the main tanks and lead to the inability to maintain control of the
vehicle because of the lack of propellants for the RCS.
o
vO
REFERENCES: HA 45, 49, 117, 121 CROSS REFERENCES: 40
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 42
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Propellent Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant Transfer Pumps
GUIDELINE TITLE: Propellant Transfer Pumps
STATEMENT:
ORBITAL PROPELLANT PUMPS SHALL BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING TWO-
PHASE FLOW.
REMARKS:
Pumps that are used for orbital propellant transfer will be exposed
to alternate gaseous and liquid propellants at the inlet of the pump. This condition
will prevail at start-up and shut-down and could occur at intermediate intervals
The pump should be designed such that it will withstand two-phase flow without
affecting pump performance.
o10
REFERENCES:
HA 83
CROSS REFERENCES:
39, 41
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 43
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Rotating Machinery
GUIDELINE TITLE: Rotating Machinery
STATEMENT:
ROTATING ELEMENTS SHALL BE LOCATED OR SHIELDED TO PREVENT DAMAGE
FROM EXPLODING FRAGMENTS.
REMARKS: Rotating machinery, such as turbine wheels, could overspeed and explode
when exposed to excessive propulsive energy due to control failure. Such rotating
devices shall be located or shielded such that the fragments or shrapnel from this
explosion will not damage adjacent components.
o10
REFERENCES: HA 84 CROSS REFERENCES:
- 61 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 44
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Capillary Devices
GUIDELINE TITLE: Capillary Propellant Settling
STATEMENT: CAPILLARY BARRIERS BE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE POSITIVE VAPOR-LIQUID
SEPARATION AND BE STRUCTURALLY CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING PROPELLANT
SLOSHING AND THE IMPACT OF SOLID PROPELLANTS.
REMARKS: The capillary devices that must be placed in the propellant tanks to utilize
this method of propellant settling are more fragile than other structural components
of the tanks. Capillary screens and channels are subject to being blocked by solidified
particles, and if the propellant pumps placed a large delta pressure across the screens,
total loss or damage could result. This restriction could prohibit the use of slush
propellants with capillary settling devices and place further restrictions on operations
that would tend to form solid particles. If the tank pressure dropped below the triple
point pressure, either deliberately or accidentally, solid particles or chunks would
be formed that could cause structural damage to screens. In addition to damage caused
by solid particles the capillary devices must be designed to resist the impact of
sloshing propellants and "g" forces introduced by acceleration.
o
UD
REFERENCES: CROSS REFERENCES:
- 62 -
27, 39, 63
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 45
HAZARD GROUP:
 2 MISSION PHASE: Propellant Transfer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 Pr0pellant Tanks and Lines
GUIDELINE TITLE: Strainers and Filters
STATEMENT: STRAINERS OR FILTERS SHALL BE PROVIDED UPSTREAM OF DEVICES OR COMPONENTS
THAT COULD BE BLOCKED OR RESTRICTED BY SOLID PARTICLE CONTAMINATION.
REMARKS:
Contamination control shall be exercised to prevent the introduction
of propellants that are contaminated beyond acceptable levels. The repetitive filling
and draining of orbital elements could accumulate contamination that would exceed
allowable levels. Components that contain small orifices, such as gas generators
and RCS engines , shall be provided with filters that are capable of eliminating solid
particles that could block these orifices.
o
vO
REFERENCES: 22, 84 CROSS REFERENCES:
- bjt - -SD72-SA-0054-2
o10
I SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 46
HAZARD GROUP:
 2 MISSION PHASE: Retrieval
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 An
GUIDELINE TITLE: Sublimation of Solid Propellents
STATEMENT: PROPELLANT MODULES THAT HAVE BEEN DE-PRESSURIZED TO VACUUM SHALL NOT BE
RETURNED IN THE SHUTTLE AS LONG AS SOLID PROPELLANTS REMAIN IN PROPELLANT
TANKS. SOLIDIFIED PARTICLES OF PROPELLANTS ON MODULE OR CARGO BAY SURFACES
SHALL NOT BE DE-ORBITED, BUT DELAYED UNTIL SOLIDS HAVE SUBLIMED.
REMARKS:
Solidified propellants will sublime in a vacuum at a rate that is dependent on the heat
input. The hazards involved with de-orbiting solidified propellants are associated with
subliming inside the cargo bay during de-orbit and resulting in fire/explosion when mixed
with atmospheric oxygen entering through the cargo bay vents. Additional risks are
associated with larger chunks that could be formed inside propellant tanks that could
damage or rupture the tanks during maneuvers and discharge more propellants inside the
cargo bay.
To minimize the possibility of returning solidified propellants inside a module
tank, the only feasible alternate is to leave the module in orbit until heat leaks
through the insulation will liquefy or sublime the solids. The time to accomplish
this would vary with the quality of the insulation and the amount of solidified
propellant.
"ice" "snow".A visual inspection of the cargo bay will verify the presence of  or
If present the cargo bay could be oriented toward the sun and the solar heat flux
of 442 Btu/ft^ over an area 15 x 60 feet would dissipate approximately 1800 pounds
of solidified, hydrogen per hour.
REFERENCES: Vol. Ill Section 4.2 CROSS REFERENCES:
3, 27, 28, 30, 47, 48, 51, 55
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 47
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Retrieval, Re-Entry
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant Tanks, Lines and Vents
G U I D E L I N E TITLE: orbital Leak Checks
STATEMENT: LEAK CHECKS SHALL BE PERFORMED ON PROPELLANT LOGISTICS SYSTEMS TO VERIFY
THAT LEAKAGE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE PRIOR TO FLUID TRANSFER OR PRIOR TO
RE-ENTRY IN THE SHUTTLE CARGO BAY.
REMARKS:
A means of leak detection must be provided for all propellant containers and inter-
connections. These provisions shall be used prior to initiating propellant transfer
in orbit and to eliminate the possibility of mixing propellants whose total pressure
could reach 2 mm Hg to minimize the possibility of fire/explosion.
A propellant module to be returned shall be visually inspected for damage and the
evidence of leakage, since orbital liquid propellant leaks are highly visible. The
cargo bay shall be visually inspected for evidence of solidifed propellants that have
been deposited by propellant leaks. If there is evidence of propellant leakage on the
modules it shall not be returned by shuttle until the propellant leakage terminates.
If solidified propellants are evident in the cargo bay the orbiter shall not re-enter
until the solids have sublimed. After emplacement the connection between the module
and shuttle shall be verified to be leak free and the module itself be free of leaks
prior to re-entry.
REFERENCES:
Ref. Vol.
HA 73, 79, 90 (17),
III Section 4.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES:
13
- 65 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
HAZARD GROUP: l MISSION PHASE: Re-Entry
A P P L I C A B L E SUBSYSTEMS:
 Propeiiant and Pressurlzation
G U I D E L I N E TITLE: orbital Propeiiant Dump
STATEMENT:
 PROPELLANTS SHALL BE DUMPED FROM PROPELLANT LOGISTICS TANKS PRIOR TO
DE-ORBIT AND RE-ENTRY IN A MANNED VEHICLE.
REMARKS:
Instrumentation errors could lead to returning propellant logistics elements in the
shuttle with an unknown quantity of liquid propellants remaining in the tank. To
minimize the fire and explosion hazard to the orbiter and crew the propellants shall
be dumped prior to re-entry. The landing weight of the element could exceed the 40 k lb.
limitation imposed by the orbiter with an unknown quantity of propellants aboard. A tank
rupture would leak to the loss of the orbiter and crew.
The residual propellants in the tanks shall be no greater than that amount which
could be vented without over-pressurizing the tanks if all the liquid were suddenly
converted to gas by contacting hot spots on the tank walls.
o
VO
REFERENCES: HA 74 CROSS REFERENCES: 3, 12, 13, 14, 55
- 66 -
.SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 49
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
Manned Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Man
GUIDELINE TITLE: Crew Fatigue
STATEMENT: DURING MANNED PROPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS NO CREW MEMBER SHALL
BE PLACED IN A CONTROL SITUATION WHEN HIS RESPONSE HAS BEEN DEGRADED
BY FATIGUE.
REMARKS:
It can be anticipated that many propellant logistics operations will demand long hours
from orbiting crewman. Procedures shall be developed for such operations that will
provide time for meals and rest such that when human control is necessary the crewman
is alert and capable of responding.
REFERENCES:
HA40
CROSS REFERENCES:
62
- 67 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 50
HAZARD GROUP: All MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Redundancy
STATEMENT: THE CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR PERFORMING CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AT A
NOMINAL LEVEL WITH ANY SINGLE COMPONENT FAILED.
REMARKS:
The single most prevalent preventive measure identified by the preferred hazard reduction
method was some form of redundancy. Sixty-six identified hazards required redundancy
to reduce their potential. These systems and the number of times they were identified
included the following:
RCS
Communications
Docking Devices
Valves
ECLSS
Computer
20
8
8
8
5
5
Other systems that required redundancy to reduce the hazard potential were identified
fewer than 5 times. It is evident that the provision of redundant systems elements is
critically important for the continued function of propellant logistics systems.
REFERENCES: MSCM 8080
66 individual hazard analyses
CROSS REFERENCES: 31, 57, 59
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 51
HAZARD GROUP: i MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
Potential Propellant Leak Points
GUIDELINE TITLE: Confined Compartments
STATEMENT: THE DESIGN OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS SHALL ELIMINATE THE
POSSIBILITY OF MIXING PROPELLANTS IN ANY SPACE WHERE THE COMBINATION
COULD REACH PRESSURES OF 2 mm Hg OR GREATER UNDER ANY COMBINATION
OF LEAKAGE CONDITIONS.
REMARKS:
Reactions that result in fire/explosion in the oxygen-hydrogen system can be initiated
when the percentage of hydrogen is 4 percent by volume or greater, when oxygen is 2 percent
by volume or greater, and the local pressure is 2 mm Hg or greater. For this reason
potential leak sources shall not be confined, but open to the ambient atmosphere. Un-
like propellant leak sources shall be physically separated as far as possible. Tank
vents of propellant logistics elements must be provided with a closed, leak checked,
venting and dumping system that terminates in the ambient atmosphere outside the cargo
bay.
REFERENCES: f 115> 116> 163 CROSS REFERENCES: 3, 6, 7, 14, 28, 29
46, 47, 48
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 52
HAZARD GROUP:
 2 MISSION PHASE:
 A11
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 A11
GUIDELINE TITLE: Operations Monitor
STATEMENT: AN OPERATIONS MONITOR SHALL BE PROVIDED THAT IS AWARE OF THE STATUS OF
ORBITAL PROPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS AND HAS THE CAPABILITY OF
ASSUMING MANUAL CONTROL OF AUTOMATIC OPERATIONS.
REMARKS:
The man/machine interface is established by the operations monitor. Communications
shall be established between the orbital element and a manned control station.
The man shall be aware of the progress of events and have the ability to over-ride
automatic operations and use his reasoning ability to safely by-pass interruptions
and complete the mission. Procedures shall be developed to place the operations
monitor in command that is closest to the operation under way. If a station keeping
orbiter is present or during orbiter attached rotation the orbiter crew-man shall be
in control. If no manned element is present in orbit adjacent to the operation in
progress then a ground monitor shall be provided.
o
10
REFERENCES: HA 57, 58, 61 CROSS REFERENCES: 54, 63
- 70 - 5D72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT
NO. 53
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Manual Override of Automatic Propellant Logistics Operations
STATEMENT: PROVIDE FOR MANUAL INTERRUPTION AND CONTROL OF AUTOMATIC PROPELLANT
LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS.
REMARKS:
Fully automatic, local control of an operation as complex as orbital propellant
transfer is within the state of the art. It is visualized, however, that failures of
these automatic sequences will occur. When these failures occur the capability must
exist to manually interrupt the automatic sequences to perform trouble shooting and
analyses in order to complete the logistics mission.
REFERENCES: (71), (75)
CROSS REFERENCES: 52, 54, 57
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 54
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: AH
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Systems Interlocks
STATEMENT: INTERLOCKS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF OUT-OF-SEQUENCE
EVENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO SYSTEM DAMAGE BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE PREPARATION
FOR SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.
REMARKS:
The successful completion of complex operations is the result of many discrete
steps. Automatic or manual controls shall be implemented to insure that no
essential step is omitted. Monitors shall be provided to insure that no critical
manual steps are skipped. Where possible, automatic features shall be designed into
propellant logistics systems to minimize the possibility of inadequate preparations.
The final operational mode and configuration shall be studied to preclude the
possibility of translating a docked element before separation, of initiating propellant
flow before chilldown, of attempts to engage line interconnect fixtures before retracting
the meteroid shield, or any other manual or automatic step that could lead to systems
damage.
REFERENCES: HA 43, 145 CROSS REFERENCES: 52, 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 55
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: PropelIant Tanks
GUIDELINE TITLE: Monitoring Quantity of PropeHants
STATEMENT:
 PROVISIONS SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN ALL PROPELLANT LOGISTICS STORAGE
TANKS TO MEASURE THE QUANTITY OF PROPELLANTS IN THE TANK.
REMARKS:
The quantity of propellants in the tanks shall be known to the monitor for successful
completion of propellent logistics operations. Dead reckoning will not provide an
accurate account of the propellants available from the main tanks to the RCS to maintain
vehicle stability for recovery by the shuttle after having discharged a partial load
to a user. An accurate propellant measuring system in the supplier vehicle will provide
a cross check in the user vehicle to verify that enough propellants are aboard the
user to complete its mission.
In case a zero g propellant gaging system is not available, conventional gravitational
techniques could be used, but would permit gaging only while the propellant is subjected
to acceleration.
o10
REFERENCES: HA 47, 83, 88, 119, 122, 165 CROSS REFERENCES: 3, n, 12, 14, 27, 46,
48
- 73 - SD72-SA-0054-2
I SPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 56
HAZARD GROUP: 2, 3, 4 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Materials Compatibility
STATEMENT: MATERIALS OR COMPONENTS ADJACENT TO FLUID LINES OR CONTAINERS SHALL
BE COMPATIBLE WITH LEAKING FLUIDS
*EMARKS:
It can be expected sometime during the use of propellant logistics systems that leaks
will develop. Any component or structural element that could be exposed to this leakage
must be capable of withstanding the effects of the fluids that leak out, whether the
leaks occur on the pad or in orbit. Consideration shall be given to the thermal shock
of leaking cryogens, rapid oxidization of combustible materials by leaking oxygen, the
thermal effects of leaking hydrogen that burns in the air, and the corrosive effect of
leaking nitrogen tetroxide.
REFERENCES:
SPD-1A
CROSS REFERENCES:
29
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 57
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE:
 A11
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
GUIDELINE TITLE: Automatic Operation
STATEMENT: REPETITIVE PR.OPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS SHALL BE AUTOMATED.
REMARKS:
The performance of man is subject to individual variations. His response is dependent
on his training, experience, emotional stability, the amount of rest he has been
permitted, and others. Any operation that is repeated shall be studied for automation
to prevent variable performance and relieve man for the role he performs best and for
which he will be the most useful in propellant logistics operations, such as problem
solving and corrective action.
REFERENCES: H^Q, 29, 30, 32, 99, 101, 105,
107, 108, 112, 130, 133, 134, 145, 154, 162,
176 (75)
CROSS REFERENCES: 52,53, 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 58
HAZARD GROUP: i MISSION PHASE:
 A11
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Propellant and Pressurization
GUIDELINE TITLE: Pressure Relief
STATEMENT: PRESSURE RELIEVING DEVICES SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO CLOSED SYSTEMS
THAT WILL RESTRICT THE PRESSURE OF THE SYSTEM TO DESIGN LIMITATIONS.
REMARKS:
Locked up gases can expand upon being heated and rupture the line or tank that contains
them. Trapped cryogens will gasify upon being heated, with a volume change of
approximately 800:1, and rupture their container. Therefore, each closed liquid
container shall be provided with a pressure relieving device.
REFERENCES: t 63> 80> 82, 167 CROSS REFERENCES: 38
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 59
HAZARD GROUP: 11 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: Communications
GUIDELINE. TITLE: Communications Blackout
STATEMENT: DURING THE ROTATION OF PROPELLANT LOGISTICS ELEMENTS,
EITHER AROUND ITS OWN AXIS OR THAT OF THE EARTH, A MEANS
SHALL BE PROVIDED TO ENSURE CONSTANT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE
ELEMENT AND THE MONITOR.
REMARKS:
Successful mission completion demands the knowledge of system status aboard
unmanned orbiting propellant logistics elements or assemblies. Prior to
initiating propellant transfer, during the extended period of the propellant transfer
and during the retrieval operation the monitor must be aware that the systems have
been prepared for the next operation.
REFERENCES: HA 69, 104 CROSS REFERENCES: 52, 61, 63
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 60
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE:
All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All Operating Systems
GUIDELINE TITLE: Man-Compatibility
STATEMENT: DURING MANNED PROPELLANT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS NO ATTACHED
ELEMENT SHALL DEGRADE THE MAN-RATING OF THE MANNED ELEMENT.
REMARKS:
Manned vehicles must be designed and operated with safety factors and levels of
redundancy such that they can be classed as "man-rated." Unmanned vehicles will
not necessarily be restricted to this degree.
Whenever an unmanned element is in close proximity to a manned element such as
transport to orbit in the cargo bay of the shuttle or propellant transfer with
orbiter attached the unmanned element shall be man-compatible by being designed or
operated in a manner such that the man-rating of the orbiter will not be jeopardized.
Human factors shall be considered during the operation of manned propellant logistics
systems, such as: the degradation of human performance while being rotated during
rotational transfer for an extended period.
REFERENCES: HA 146 CROSS REFERENCES: 49
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ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 61
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
All Manual Operations
GUIDELINE TITLE: Crew Training
STATEMENT: PROGRAMS SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED TO TRAIN PROPELLANT LOGISTICS
CREWMEN IN ALL MANUAL OPERATIONS
REMARKS:
All ground and airborne crew members shall be trained in all operations, normal and
emergency, they are to perform. Trainers shall be developed to closely simulate the
conditions to be experienced when performing the actual operation.
REFERENCES: HA21, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 86,
89, 94, 96, 124, 127, 132, 138, 172, 173
CROSS REFERENCES :62
--79 - SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO.
 62
HAZARD GROUP: MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS:
 A11 Manual Operations
GUIDELINE TITLE: Procedures Development
STATEMENT: ALL MANUAL OPERATIONS SHALL BE GUIDED BY WRITTEN PROCEDURES THAT
INCLUDE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
REMARKS:
Procedures shall be developed that cover all manual operations. Safety precautions
and emergency or back-out procedures shall be included in the text at the point at
which they are applicable. A ground monitor that is not subject to other distractions
shall use such procedures as check-off lists to ensure that no essential step performed
in orbit is omitted.
REFERENCES: HA21,29,36,52,58,59,60,61,62,63,
65,68,72,73,79,85,88,90,93,94,98,102,105,109,
111, 112, 118,119,124,126,127,129,130,132-138,
,147,155-158,160,164,168,171,172,174, 176-
CROSS REFERENCES:
- 80 -
52, 61
SD72-SA-0054-2
ISPSS GUIDELINE/REQUIREMENT NO. 63
HAZARD GROUP: 2 MISSION PHASE: All
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS: All
G U I D E L I N E TITLE: Malfunction Detection and Warning Devices
STATEMENT: DEVIATIONS OF NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS SHALL BE
DISPLAYED TO THE OPERATIONS MONITOR.
REMARKS:
The design process shall include an evaluation of the malfunction detectors to be
provided and the manner in •which this information is to be displayed. Warning
devices to be considered will include:
1. Over and under pressure
2. Over and under temperature
3. Over and under voltage
4. Operation on reserves
5. Operation on redundant systems
6. For time critical emergencies the provision of and initiation
of automatic corrective action
7. Environmental conditions in LSS
REFERENCES: HA 33, 53, 55, 69, 72, 80,
100, 109, 114, 124, 125, 142, 157
CROSS REFERENCES: 6, 7, 54
- 81 - SD72-SA-0054-2
